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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RAE ADAMSON,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Petitioner/Appellant,
-vs-

Appellate Case No. 20030108-SC
Court of Appeals No. 20010516-CA
District Court No. 874904654

RANAE ADAMSON,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

RESPONDENT/APPELLEE (hereinafter "Respondent") submits the following as
her brief in the above matter.
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order
herein, which is the Order Denying Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, dated December 12, 2001, pursuant to the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-2, and by reason of a grant
of certiorari herein.
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The matter before the trial court was a "Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce",
and the matter being appealed before this Court is the "Order Denying the Petition to
Modify" and the "Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal: For purposes of this appeal, is
Appellant/Petitioner's case ripe for review by this Court? For purposes of this appeal, did
the court abuse its discretion in finding that there was not a substantial and material change
in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony? For purposes of this appeal, trial
courts are in the best position to modify awards of alimony.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES. STATUES AND RULES
The following statutes and cases are applicable to the disposition of this appeal:
U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(7); Adelman v. Adelman. 815 P.2d 741, (UT App 1991); Johnson v.
Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (UT App 1993); Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake Citv Commission. 624
P.2d 1138 (UT 1981); and Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103 (UT App 1999).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court has the "continuing jurisdiction" discretion to deny a modification in
an alimony order, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) and (ii), if the court
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determines that the party petitioning the court has not reached his burden o! demonstrating
a substantial and material change in circumstances.
The trial court's findings are "presumed valid," and the Appellate Court reviews
these issues "under an abuse of discretion standard." Bolliger v. Bolliger, 997 P 2d 903,
906 (UT App 2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent relies upon Petitioner's statement of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties to this action were husband and wife, but were divorced on February 9,
1989, in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. See Exhibit "C." The court entered
a permanent alimony obligation to Petitioner in the amount of $200.00 per month on behalf
of the Respondent to become effective the date the decree was entered. Decree of Divorce
at Tf 11. The entire reference to alimony contained in the Findings of Fact reads as follows:
Both parties to this action are able-bodied and employable. However, Defendant
[Respondent] is in need of support. It is reasonable, just, and proper that Plaintiff
[Petitioner] be ordered to pay to the Defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars
($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, commencing with the month of February
1989, and continuing until the death of the Plaintiff or Defendant, or until
Defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until further
order of this court. This award of alimony is subject to review by the court on July
7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. before the assigned judge.
Findings of Fact at f 13.
3

The alimony award did not change after the review date.
The trial court that adjudicated the divorce action also specifically addressed the
Petitioner's retirement benefits. The court acknowledged that Petitioner would have
benefits as a result of retirement and made an order in regard to the division of these
benefits. The entire reference to retirement benefits contained in the Findings of Fact
reads as follows:
[Petitioner] has acquired an interest in a retirement plan through his employment
with the State of Utah, which should be divided equally between the parties
according to the Woodward Formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
should issue from this Court.
Findings of Fact at ^ 12.
Petitioner brought his petition to modify because he was reaching retirement age
and expressed that he wanted to retire. At the time of the trial, Petitioner had reached
retirement age, but he had made the choice to continue working. Petitioner had not retired,
had maintained his employment, and had not experienced substantial and material changes
in his work status.

The trial court denied the Petition to Modify.

Despite being of retirement age and wishing to retire, the Petitioner had not retired because
he claims that he cannot afford to retire and pay the small amount of alimony awarded to
the Respondent, which he has never voluntarily paid. The trial court found:
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The Petitioner has not retired from employment, to date, despite his eligibility to do
so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will
continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony obligation continues.
This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the
alimony obligation to terminate the obligation.
Findings of Fact at f 12.
The trial court appropriately found that the Petitioner's impending retirement was
not a substantial material change in circumstances. The trial court repeatedly makes
reference to the fact that Petitioner has chosen at the present time not to retire. The court
further notes:
[T]he ruling that Judge Rigtrup made in the original divorce decree certainly
contemplates retirement. If it didn't, [Respondent] would not have been awarded a
percentage of [Petitioner's] retirement. At the same time, it awards alimony that
goes past age 65. That's clear, too. So I would surmise that Judge Rigtrup meant
that the alimony payment should go on [sic] retirement.
Record, at 53, lines 5-16.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner brought a Petition to Modify the parties' Decree of Divorce as to the
issue of alimony. Petitioner based his petition upon the expectation that he was
considering retirement, and this future event constituted a material and substantial change
in circumstance. Petitioner further claimed that he would not be able to »ilToi 11 to retire and
pay alimony to the Respondent. Therefore, Petitioner requested that the Court modify the
5

parties' Decree of Divorce and terminate Respondent's permanent alimony award. The trial
court denied the Petitioner's Petition to Modify.
The trial court determined that the underlying basis for Petitioner's Petition to
Modify did not rise to the standard of demonstrating that a material and substantial change
in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, which may warrant
a modification of the alimony.

Petitioner had not retired at the time that he filed the

petition, and he asked the Court to consider the possibility of future events occurring when
ruling on this matter, future events being Petitioner's impending retirement and
Respondent's impending application for social security benefits. Petitioner maintained that
these would be material and substantial changes in circumstances not contemplated by the
original court in issuing the Decree of Divorce.
The future retirement and social security benefits of the parties should be
considered issues that are not ripe before the Court and therefore Petitioner's Petition to
Modify was appropriately denied. The Utah Supreme Court notes that when parties find
themselves in a position that may sometime in the future happen, this question is not ripe
before the court for adjudication. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624
P.2d 1138 (UT 1981).

6

The Court could not consider Petitioner's Petition to Modify in that his
circumstances had not substantially and materially changed since the Decree was entered.
The Petitioner's having not yet retired made it inappropriate for the Court to consider this
as a material change, since it had not yet happened. The Court appropriately did not make
rulings or issue orders based upon the hope of the parties that these circumstances may
occur.
The Court determined that Petitioner had not met his burden demonstrating the
material and substantial change in circumstances. It determined that the court having issued
the original Decree of Divorce took into consideration the future of the parties' financial
circumstances when it issued the permanent alimony award.
The Court further noted that it believed that the original trial court took into
consideration the Petitioner's retirement in issuing the alimony award to Respondent.

The

original trial court specifically addressed Petitioner's future retirement and Respondent's
ongoing financial hardships when it issued the alimony.
Finally, when the Court made a note of the parties' financial situations, it used
approximations to measure the monetary value of parties' future financial circumstances.
The Appellate Court has noted that it is the trial court that should consider current
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evidence of the parties' financial situations, in that their circumstances may have changed
during the appeal. Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431 (UT App 1999).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY BECAUSE
PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE AN ISSUE RIPE BEFORE THE COURT
AND FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS A
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
SINCE THE TIME OF THE PARTIES' DIVORCE.

Petitioner was almost 66 years old when his petition to modify came before the trial
court. The parties were divorced on the 20th day of March, 1989. The divorce decree
provided two important applicable provisions: Petitioner was ordered to divide and share
the equity in his retirement equally with the Respondent; and Petitioner was further ordered
to pay Respondent alimony in the amount of $200.00 per month to continue until
Respondent remarries, cohabits or either party dies. Petitioner brought his petition to
modify based upon the possibility that he may retire soon, and it would be a financial
burden for him to continue to pay alimony.
The trial court properly found that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that a
substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred since the parties' decree of
divorce. The issue of Petitioner's pending retirement goes to the heart of his case, but this
argument is fundamentally flawed. Petitioner's retirement, and petitioner's actual financial
8

condition therefrom, were only placed before the trial court prospectively. Because
Petitioner's financial condition had not changed, this case was not ripe for ruling before the
trial court.
It is well settled law in Utah that the Court can not render decisions that are not ripe
for adjudication. The Utah Court of Appeals affirms this position in Adelman v. Adelman,
815 P.2d 741 (UT App 1991). The Adelman case was brought before the court on appeal
from an order to show cause clarifying in part, enforcing in part, and modifying in part from
a divorce decree of the parties. Mr. Adelman claimed that the trial court erred in awarding
Ms. Adelman survivorship benefits in the modification. The parties both agreed that Ms.
Adelman had in fact remarried before the age of fifty-five which would render her
ineligible for the survivor benefits. However, Ms. Adelman further contended that her
survivorship benefits could be reinstated if her current marriage ended in divorce,
annulment, or widowhood. The Court of Appeals determined that the issue was
inappropriate for review since the issue was not ripe. "Ripeness occurs when u a conflict
over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of
legal rights and obligations between parties thereto." Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741;
Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake City Commission. 624 P.2d 1138 (UT 1981) (Emphasis
added).
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In the case at hand, Petitioner, Mr. Adamson, asks the trial court to rule on an event
in the future that has not transpired. Mr. Adamson asks the trial Court to terminate the
alimony award based upon the possibility of his retirement occurring. Petitioner asks the
court to speculate that when or if this event happens, it should be considered a substantial
change in circumstances in order to modify the parties' decree of divorce. Petitioner is
therefore asking the Court to rule on an issue that is not ripe before the Court. By bringing
his petition untimely, on the prospect that he may want to retire, Petitioner places no actual
issue before the trial Court, only a hypothetical situation. Petitioner further encumbers the
court with additional complexities that said retirement would cause Petitioner a financial
hardship if he were to continue paying Respondent alimony. The trial court found:
The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his eligibility
to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will
continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony obligation continues.
This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the
alimony obligation to termination that obligation.
Findings of Fact at ^f 16. (Emphasis added).
This Court has stated that "[wjhere there exists no more than a difference of opinion
regarding the hypothetical application of [an insurance provision] to a situation in which the
parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for adjudication."
Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148(UT 1981): Boyle
10

et. al. v. National Fire Insurance Company, 866 P.2d 595 at 597 (UT App 1993). In the
case at hand, Petitioner asks the trial court to rule on a hypothetical question. The court
acknowledges that if the parties were to change their positions, (i.e. Petitioner retire &
Respondent waive alimony) it would be of benefit to both parties. However, since the
question before the court has not yet happened, the court cannot force the parties to act in a
reasonable manner. "The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in
order to induce the Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement benefits,
which are greater than the alimony, is not reasonable in the premises. However, the court
cannot require the parties to behave reasonably in settlement discussions." (Findings of
Fact at Tf 20). It is clear from this finding that the court felt that its hands were tied, since
the Petitioner had not actually retired.
"If any action is ripe for adjudication, it is within the court's discretion to either
grant or deny a party's request for declaratory relief. If on the other hand, an action is not
ripe for adjudication, it is not within the trial court's discretion to grant declaratory relief,
but instead the trial court must dismiss the action as a matter of law." Boyle, et. al. v.
National Union Fire Insurance Company, 866 P.2d 595 at 598 (UT App 1993). This Court
has noted that it is improper for a trial court to address certain issues, because the case
itself was not "ripe" before the court. "The proper course would have been to dismiss for
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lack of ripeness. We may, however, 'affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground
available to the court, even if it is one not relied on below.'" Salt Lake County v. Bangerter,
928 P.2d 384 (UT 1996).
Based upon the mere possibility that Petitioner would at some point in the near
future retire from his employment and begin to collect retirement benefits is not an
adequate basis for his request to modify the divorce decree. The case at hand was not ripe
for adjudication and the trial Court, correctly dismissed Petitioner's Petition to Modify,
which the Court of Appeals properly affirmed.
POINT 2

IF PETITIONER RETIRED, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY
THE ALIMONY AWARD ON THE BASIS THAT IT FOUND THAT
THERE HAD NOT BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

The facts of this case support the argument that the trial court that issued the
original alimony award contemplated the totality of the parties' circumstances both at the
time of the trial and on a long term basis. This is evidenced in several points of fact set
forth in the record. The trial court specifically makes an alimony award that has no
termination date, until certain events occur, (i.e. remarriage, cohabitation, or death of one
of the parties, whichever occurs first). The Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent
$200.00 per month in alimony. Then the Court also addresses the fact that the Petitioner
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will have retirement to which Respondent is entitled and awarded one-half. In the Finding
of Facts Tf 15, the Court orders Respondent to pay child support in the amount of $75.00
per month. The Court clearly recognized that Respondent would have a difficult time in
paying her support obligation in that it stated "[i]n any month when the [respondent] fails to
make an actual monetary payment to [petitioner] for child support, the child support shall
be deducted from [respondent's] lien upon the marital residence of the parties." The court
recognized that Respondent had an ongoing and permanent financial need and offset her
obligations in her equity, rather than in her alimony income. It seems clear that the court
took many things into consideration when computing alimony in this original decree
including the ongoing permanent need that Respondent would have for this income. The
court in the Petitioner's Petition to Modify specifically finds that: "The [trial] court did not
order initially that alimony would terminate upon the Petitioner's retirement, or at any
other time, other than the Petitioner's death or Respondent's death, remarriage or
cohabitation, and from this the court concludes that the trial court originally did not intend
alimony ever to terminate." Findings of Facts at ^ 23.

The trial court has the discretion

and continuing jurisdiction to make modifications as to divorce decrees pursuant to U.C.A.
§ 30-3-5(3). "However, where a future change in circumstances is contemplated by the
trial court in the divorce decree, the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute a
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material change in circumstances sufficient to modify the award." Johnson v. Johnson, 855
P.2d 250 (UT App 1993). "A change in circumstances reasonably contemplated at the time
of divorce is not legally cognizable as a substantial change in circumstances in
modification proceedings." Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 729 (UT App 1990). The Court of
Appeals reasoned in the Johnson case that "[s]ince the trial court in the instant case divided
the pension plan between the parties, it was cognizant of Mrs. Johnson's ability to receive
additional income in the future that would alter her financial condition and needs." Johnson
v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (UT App 1993).
Petitioner relies on Bolliger v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903 (UT App 2000) to support
their argument. The Bolliger case, however, provides a distinguishable fact situation that
the case at hand does not possess. In Bolliger, while the divorce decree contemplated
permanent alimony in conjunction with retirement benefits, the husband was forced into
early retirement, making the timing of his retirement benefits and income substantially
different from what would have been contemplated in the Divorce Decree. Id. at 3,4,20.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the husband's "forced retirement. . . [was] not foreseen at
the time of the divorce," and therefore the basis for modification. Id. at 20 (emphasis
added). In the instant case, the timing of the retirement of Petitioner was foreseen and not
unexpected at the time of the divorce. The trial court and the divorce decree specifically
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address the fact that there are retirement benefits that would be derived from Petitioner's
retirement. Most people become eligible for retirement benefits at the age of sixty-five
(65), and Petitioner is no different. At the time of his Petition, he was 66 years old and
eligible to reap the benefits of retirement. However, by his own choice, Petitioner failed
to retire, and he maintained his employment.
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first
show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the
decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Bolliger at 11. The responsibility is
therefore placed upon Petitioner to establish that there indeed has been a material change
that has happened, not contemplated in the original divorce. Petitioner failed to meet his
burden in demonstrating that his retirement was "not contemplated in the decree itself," Id.,
and therefore the trial court appropriately denied the petition to modify. The present
findings of fact for the Petition to Modify specifically address a reasonable finding that the
original trial court took into consideration the Petitioner's retirement when determining
the alimony award, which is clearly reasonable and within the court's discretion.
POINT 3:

IF A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
COULD BE FOUND, THE ALIMONY AWARD SHOULD BE
REMANDED FOR MORE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO THE
PARTIES' FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
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If the trial court were found to have abused its discretion in failing to find a
substantial and material change in circumstances not contemplated in the divorce decree,
this matter would still need to be remanded to the trial court to find the parties' current and
actual financial status, and determine if alimony should be modified, contrary to the
assertions of Petitioner. Petitioner maintains that this Court has sufficient information to
modify the alimony award. The Court of Appeals in Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d
1103 (UT App 1999) clearly contradicts this this premise:
"[T]he power to terminate [alimony] should be exercised with caution and only after
full consideration of the circumstances of the parties. . . ." 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce
and Separation § 813 (1998) (emphasis added). We note, for the trial court's
guidance on remand, that for the trial court to terminate [an] alimony award, there
must be an articulated basis for doing so, i.e., the court must be persuaded that [the
recipient spouse] will be able to support [him- or] herself at a standard of living to
which [he or] she was accustomed during the parties' marriage, or that [the payor
spouse] is no longer able to pay.
(Williamson at 12).
The Williamson Court goes on to note that the trial court should take into consideration the
payor's loss of income, but that fact alone should not be enough to rationalize a complete
termination of alimony. The termination of an alimony award should be done with caution.
In Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (UT App 1990) the trial court terminated an alimony
award to the wife upon her reaching the age of sixty-two.
and found the following:
16

The Appellate court disagreed

In the present case, appellant is a woman in her late fifties, who, while in reasonably
good health, has never been substantially employed and has not developed any
employable skills. It is similarly unrealistic to assume that she will ever be able to
provide for herself at any reasonable level. Therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion in terminating her alimony award at age sixty-two.
(Munns at 122).
In the current case, Respondent, Ms. Adamson, is in her sixties, has limited job skills, and
has been determined to be disabled. The court in Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 438 (UT
App 1999), states that "the trial court should consider current evidence of the parties'
financial situations, as their 'circumstances . . . may have changed during this appeal.'" Here
we have the same situation, with over two years having passed to date since the trial court
denied the Petition to Modify, on May 18, 2001. For instance, Petitioner's expenses of
$380.00 monthly for his son's church mission have likely expired, as may have other
installment debts of Petitioner. See Order Denying Petition to Modify at ^f 19.
It is necessary to accurately ascertain the current and actual financial situation of the
parties. The trial court itself notes in its Findings several times that it only approximates
the parties' future financial positions. The termination or alteration of an alimony award
should be based upon facts, not approximations. Therefore, this court should not terminate
Respondent's alimony award. If this court finds an abuse of discretion in denying the
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petition to modify, it should remand to the trial court for further findings concerning
potential modification.
POINT 4

APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO ABIDE
BY THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT

The trial court ordered both parties to bear their own substantial attorney's fees,
which neither party has appealed (Findings Tf 21). When presented with this same situation
(with a similar denial of the termination of alimony) in Carter v. Carter. 584 P.2d 904
(Utah 1978), the court agreed with defendant / appellee's argument that she should be
entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal. The court's justification was simply "that
inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's judgment, and that
[defendant] has been put to the necessity of defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have
to bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees for her counsel." (Carter at
906).
Appellee Ranae Adamson is disabled, and appellant has refused to voluntarily pay
any portion of his alimony, absent court enforcement, from the date of the original decree
of divorce. Appellee is entitled to attorney's fees for having to defend this appeal when her
only source of income is Social Security Disability and the alimony ordered to be paid by
Appellant. Appellee requests that attorney fees and costs be awarded on appeal, and that the
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case be remanded for the purpose of determining and awarding her such attorneys fees as
the trial court finds to be reasonable and properly incurred on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's arguments for appeal are fundamentally flawed. Petitioner brought a
petition to modify based upon the premise that he may retire at some time in the future.
Since the Petitioner's Petition to Modify was unripe for adjudication, it was properly
denied.
Beyond the question of ripeness, the premise for Petitioner's substantial and
material change in circumstances stems again from the retirement issue. Petitioner's
retirement may only be considered a substantial and material change so long as it was not
contemplated in the original decree of divorce, which it was. The burden is upon Petitioner
to demonstrate that he has satisfied both of these prongs, which he fails to do.
Finally, if this court were to deem it appropriate to recalculate the alimony amount,
that should be remanded to the trial court to make an accurate and current determination as
to the alimony award based upon the parties' present situations.
For the reasons stated in Respondent's arguments, this court should deny all aspects
of Petitioner's appeal and award Respondent costs and attorney's fees in defending this
appeal.
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EXHIBIT "A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Petitioner
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)328-1162

Osputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

RAE ADAMSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER DENYING PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
-vs-

Civil No. 874904654DA

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

Respondent.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the courtfortrial on April 17,
2001, Petitioner appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, Mary C.
Corporon, Respondent appearing in person and by and through her counsel of record,
Nathan Pace, the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and having
received the exhibits of the parties, the court having heard the arguments of counsel and
having reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and for good
cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties to this action were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in
the above-entitled case in 1989.

2.

At the time of the divorce of the parties, they had been married for a
period of time between 17 and 18 years.

3.

At the time of the divorce, the parties were the parents of minor children,
all of whom have now achieved their majority. However, the Petitioner
testified and the court finds that the Petitioner has an adult son residing
with him, and that the Petitioner is supporting the youngest child of these
two parties in serving a religious mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Petitioner was
awarded custody of the parties' children, subject to Respondent's rights of
visitation. The Respondent was ordered to pay child support for the
parties' children of $75.00 per month per child, and the court, within the
decree of divorce, specifically awarded Respondent an interest in the
marital residence, but provided that her child support obligation would be
set off against her home equity. The court now finds that the trial court's
prior determination to allow a set-off of child support against home equity
constituted a finding by the court in the initial proceedings herein that the
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Respondent could not be relied upon to pay support regularly to the
parties' children.
4.

Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Respondent was awarded alimony
from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. The Petitioner failed
to pay any of his alimony timely, and a judgment for alimony arrearages
was previously entered against him in the above-entitled court, in the sum
of $16,900.00. The Petitioner paid that to Respondent in a lump sum to
satisfy this judgment early in the year 2000. Respondent has testified and
the court finds that the Respondent has expended the entirety of the lump
sum payment for these alimony arrearages in repaying a loan to her
brother and, in paying her utilities and her usual and routine living
expenses.

5.

The Respondent did not pay any of her child support to the Petitioner,
and eventually the entire amount of her child support was withheld from
her equitable lien in the marital residence. As a result thereof, the
Respondent's equitable lien in the residence was extinguished, and
Respondent has no remaining interest in the equity in the marital
residence.
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6.

The court finds that each party has been a "deadbeat," to some extent,
the Petitioner for failure to pay alimony timely as previously ordered - the
Respondent for failure to pay child support for the parties' minor children
during their minority when they were in need of actual support.

7.

The court ordered the Petitioner to be taken into a holding cell to show
him what the court can do with men who refuse to obey court orders.

8.

The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and
will achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the
date of trial herein.

9.

Based upon the court's observations of the Petitioner at trial, his
demeanor and appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there
is a cultural expectation in our society that persons can retire from fulltime employment at the age of 65, the court finds that it is reasonable, just
and proper that the Petitioner retire at this time.

10.

The Respondent herein is 58 years of age. The Respondent is not
currently employed and has not been employed at all since the entry of
the decree of divorce herein. The Respondent testified and the court
finds that the Respondent did not ever make any application for any
employment since the entry of the decree of divorce, as previously
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ordered by the court. The Respondent has testified that she did not make
application for employment because of her disability. The court finds that
she has not endeavored to improve her situation. The court finds
Respondent could have done so, if she had tried and if she had wanted
to.
11.

The Respondent receives Social Security Disability benefits in the sum of
$530.00 per month. The Respondent testified that she did not receive
any other income from any other source, including food stamps or public
assistance. However, the Respondent does receive the benefit of public
housing, and her rent for her apartment is approximately $87.00 per
month after the subsidy, for an apartment usually renting for $500.00 per
month.

12.

The Respondent has reasonable and necessary living expenses, in
addition to $87.00 per month for rent, of $150.00 per month for utilities,
$250.00 per month for food and household supplies, and that she is
entitled to incur reasonable expenses for such things as clothing or
transportation. The Respondent does not have a motor vehicle nor does
she have a telephone. She testified to the court from the witness stand
that she is physically able to ride the city bus.

5

13.

The Respondent was married to the Petitioner for a period of time in
excess of 10 years and the Petitioner has now achieved the age of 65.
Accordingly, the court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to obtain Social
Security retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration,
based upon the Petitioner's receiving Social Security retirement benefits.
However, the Respondent has failed to make application for these
benefits. The court finds that, were she to apply for Social Security
retirement benefits, those benefits would be received by her in the sum of
approximately $500.00 to $700.00 per month.

14.

The Respondent is entitled to receive a portion of the Petitioner's
retirement benefits, based upon her marriage to the Petitioner during a
period of time when he was also employed by his current employer, the
State of Utah. The court finds that, therefore, the Respondent would be
entitled to receive approximately 25% of the actual retirement benefit
awarded to the Petitioner, or approximately $6,500.00 per year or
$541.66 per month, upon the Petitioner's retirement from full-time
employment.

15.

The court finds that, were the Petitioner to retire from his employment with
the State of Utah and were Respondent to receive Social Security
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retirement benefits and her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, the
Respondent would be in a significantly better economic position than she
is at the present time, receiving Social Security disability benefits and
alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month.
16.

The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his
eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation
to pay alimony will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that
he will be unable to meet his expenses on a reduced income from
retirement, if the alimony obligation continues. This was the Petitioner's
stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the alimony obligation to
terminate that obligation.

17.

The Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah Division of Child and
Family Services as a social worker. His gross annual income is
approximately $40,000.00, or $3,333.33 per month. From this is withheld
federal and state taxes of approximately $848.00, and his net income is
$2,485.33 per month.

18.

In addition to the foregoing income from his employment, the Petitioner
has requested and has begun to receive Social Security retirement
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benefits by reason of his having achieved his 65th birthday, and those
benefits are paid to him in the sum of approximately $1,250.00 per month.
19.

The Petitioner has reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses as
follows:
Rent/Mortgage:

$

Property Taxes:
Insurance:
Maintenance:
Food/Supplies:
Utilities (water/gas/
electric/heat:
Telephone:
Laundry/Dry Clean:
Clothing:
Medical and Dental
Medical Insurance
Life Insurance
Union Dues
Entertainment:
Incidentals:
Auto expenses:
Installments:
Other expenses:
Other expenses:
Attorney's fees:

$
$
$
$

400.00 to amortize the loan or $280.00 to pay
interest only.
110.00
45.00
100.00
460.00

i

TOTAL EXPENSES:

20.

$ 150.00
55.00
$
$
10.00
50.00
$
$ 125.00
30.00
$
35.00
$
14.00
$
100.00
$
$ 100.00
$ 250.00
$1,176.00
$ 200.00 (alimony)
$ 380.00 (missionary cost for son on mission)
$ 150.00

$3,940.00

The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to
induce the Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement
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benefits, which are greater than the alimony, is not reasonable in the
premises. However, the court cannot require the parties to behave
reasonably in settlement discussions.
21.

Each party to this action has incurred substantial attorney's fees, and
each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court
costs and attorney's fees incurred in this action.

22.

Petitioner has requested that this court order that alimony terminate after
the duration of the parties' marriage, given the adoption of new statutory
law generally limiting the duration of alimony to the length of a marriage.
The court declined to grant this request.

23.

The court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's
death or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this,
this court concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony
ever to terminate.

BASED UPON the foregoing and for good cause appearing the court now makes
and enters the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter to this action and over
the parties to this action

2.

There has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances
warranting a modification of alimony

3.

The Petitioner does not come to this court with clean hands, and is
therefore not entitled to the relief which he is seeking.

4

The court should not modify the duration of the alimony, to terminate after
the duration of the parties' marriage.
ORDER

BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and for good
cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED*
The Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is hereby dismissed,
each party to pay and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in
this action.
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DATED THIS

l& day of

Hfc^,^

, 2001.

BY THE COURT:

STEPHEN L HEN
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed to:
NATHAN PACE
Attorney for Respondent
136 South Main, #404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

on this

J

2001.

day of
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EXHIBIT "B

FIIETI B1STK1CT CSURT
Thtfd Judicial District

MARY C. CORPORON #7 34
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

MAR 2 0 1989
By-

1

Deputy Cfcf*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
RAE ADAMSON,
FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No, D87-4654

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February,
1989,

the

Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup,

Judge

presiding;

the

plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C.
Corporon,
through
sworn
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counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard
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arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being
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than

90

days

having

elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, the
Court now makes and enters the following:
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necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this

action and over the subject matter of this action.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the

defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing
between

the

parties, the

same

to

become

final

and

effective

immediately upon being signed by the Judge and entered by the
Clerk in the register of actions.
3.

The Decree of Divorce granted to plaintiff should be in

conformance with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED THIS

%6 ^ d a y of

facj*Jbi

, 1989.

BY THE COURT
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KENNETH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
RAE ADAMSON.
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

-vs-

Civil No. D87-4654

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February,
1989,

the Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup,

Judge

presiding; the

plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C
Corporon, and the defendant appearing

in person and by

and

through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the
sworn testimony

of . the parties

and their witnesses

and

the

arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being
fully advised

in the premises and more than 90 days having

elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
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family therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health,
the

Utah

State

Department

of

Social

Services,

or

another

qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the
conflict between the defendant and the minor children of the
parties.
6.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the truck, free and clear of

any interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the
Ford-Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff.
7.

Plaintiff js ordered to pay and assume all debts and

obligations incurred by the parties until the date of the divorce
herein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant
for her living accommodations.
8.

The

parties'

previous

division

of

their

items

of

personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, and household
furnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each
and each party is awarded those items 'currently in his or her own
possession, with the exception of the following items, which are
hereby awarded to the defendant:

the grandfather clock, one set

of bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of
the tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual
table and chairs.
9.

Plaintiff

is hereby awarded

the permanent

use and

possession of the real property of the parties located at 4195
South 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right,
title and interest therein, including the right to any reserve
account, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject
to the first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon,
which plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold
3
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review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the
assigned judge.
12.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment

opportunities and all job training opportunities available to her
as set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court.
Further, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of
three

applications

for employment

per week with

prospective

employers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this
Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989.
13.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum

of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing
with the month of February 1989 and continuing until such time as
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from
high school.in the normal course of their high school educations#
whichever event occurs later.

In any month when the defendant

fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child
support, said child support shall be deducted from defendant's
lien on the marital residence of the parties.
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988).
14.

Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own

court costs and attorney's fees.
15.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
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property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
DATED THIS
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BY THE COURT

KENNETH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge
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